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Abstract—We present the basic architectural elements of
the Captive Portal integrating Shibboleth based Authenti-
cation, Authorization, Accounting and Auditing into Wire-
less Mesh Networks. The Captive Portal is built upon the
SWITCHaai/Shibboleth architecture especially designed to pro-
tect web based services. The architecture is secure, eavesdropping
protected and does not require any specialized software installa-
tion on the client side.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we present an architecture of the Authentica-
tion, Authorization, Accounting and Auditing capable Wireless
Mesh Network built out of wireless Local Area Networks
(LANs).
A. Requirements
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Figure 1. Wireless Networks
We start by describing the context of this work: Wireless
Mesh Networks (WMNs), a current state of Authentication,
Authorization and Accounting (AAA) and our main goal: an
integration of AAA into WMNs.
1) Wireless Networks: In Figure 1, we present the most
prominent examples of wireless networks: infrastructure net-
works, ad-hoc networks and finally WMNs.
In infrastructure networks, we distinguish Mobile Stations
(MSs), Access Points (APs) and a wired Distribution System
(DS). MSs equipped with wireless interfaces connect to APs
having both wireless and wired interfaces. Every AP connected
to a wired DS provides access to the Internet. Each AP
forwards traffic between a MS and the DS. Consequently, the
MS benefits from single hop wireless connectivity obtaining
the access to the Internet.
In ad-hoc networks, there is no distinction between a MS
and an AP and the DS does not exist. MSs communicate
with each other by using their wireless interfaces. To provide
multi-hop communication, a network runs a routing protocol.
MSs can communicate even if they are not directly connected,
because intermediate nodes on the path between communicat-
ing MSs forward information. Some of the MSs may provide
access to the Internet sharing their Internet connection with
other MSs in the ad-hoc network.
A WMN can be considered as a wireless network lying
in between infrastructure networks and ad-hoc networks [1].
A WMN distinguishes Mesh Nodes (MNs) and MSs, but the
wired DS does not exist. The information is propagated by
using the wireless interfaces in a multi-hop manner. MNs are
more stable than MSs meaning they do not move frequently
and have longer up-times. MNs form a wireless backhaul and
they exchange information by using wireless interfaces. To
implement a multi-hop propagation of information, a wireless
backhaul runs a routing protocol. MSs get connectivity to
the network by using their wireless interfaces, associating
themselves with MNs. Normally, MSs are not involved in
the routing operation, they are client terminals of a WMN.
A wireless backhaul connected to the Internet may offer an
Internet connection to MSs.
A WMN is a low cost complement or an extension to the
wired Internet [2], because it does not require establishing
a wired infrastructure. The WMN providing a signal should
have similar characteristics to wired networking in terms of
accessibility, reliability, robustness and performance.
A wired network is highly reliable and built out of ex-
pensive, robust, reliable, high performance routers especially
designed for packet forwarding. Accessibility of these systems
often exceeds 99%. Wired network adapters are very reliable
so that packets are almost not affected by losses due to signal
propagation. They operate with fixed link capacities delivering
a signal on large distances with high data rates. If a link fulfills
the technical requirements of the device, it is able to achieve a
desired throughput. High performance routing protocols deal
with route failures and automatically redirect traffic to backup
routes in case of link problems.
Wireless Networks are different. A WMN is a perfect
solution for last mile connectivity because of its low cost
and ease of use, however, a single hop, long range operation
is difficult to manage due to signal propagation conditions,
attenuation and timescales introduced by MAC layers. Because
of all these problems, we are enforced to send data in a
multi-hop manner in which MNs push packets closer their
destinations. Wireless links are lossy and highly affected by
the signal propagation conditions and MAC interactions. The
link capacity is not well defined. It depends on the link
length, signal strength, noise level, interferences, changing
weather conditions (e.g., precipitation, humidity, fog, pollu-
tion), collisions, topological problems (e.g., hidden, exposed
node problems), etc. As a consequence, routing protocols must
deal with many factors that do not exist in wired networks, so
the path selection process is very complex and yet not well
understood. Wireless mesh nodes are often not so powerful
and reliable as high performance wired routers. Because of
all above situations, building a high performance WMN is
a challenge. Wireless Mesh Networking should be able to
provide the same services as wired networking meaning data,
voice and video transmissions with similar quality of service.
2) AAA in wireless networks: There exist many wireless
infrastructure networks giving access to the Internet (cf., Fig-
ure 2). The most important disadvantage of an infrastructure
network is that each AP requires a wired connection that
limits the network range to areas in which the infrastructure
already exists and increases operational costs, because a cabled
infrastructure is expensive. To protect the Internet connection
against unauthorized users, only a limited number of services
is available immediately after a MS associates itself with
an AP. Normally, a MS can only communicate with Virtual
Private Network (VPN) servers, Wi-Fi Protected Access II
(WPA2) [3] running APs and Captive Portals. The VPN mode
of operation is out of scope of this paper. We only focus on
WPA2 APs and Captive Portals based on the The Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) Network Access Server (NAS)
model described in [4], [5]. Based on the IETF NAS model,
each service providing access to the Internet deals with the
following functionalities:
• “Authentication refers to the confirmation that a user who
is requesting services is a valid user of the network
services requested. Authentication is accomplished via
the presentation of an identity and credentials. Examples
of types of credentials are passwords.
• Authorization refers to the granting of specific types of
service (including no service) to users, based on their
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Figure 2. Current state of AAA oriented networking
authentication, what services they are requesting, and the
current system state.
• Accounting refers to the tracking of the consumption of
NAS resources by users. This information may be used
for management, planning, billing, or other purposes.
• Auditing refers to the tracking of activity by users. As
opposed to accounting, where the purpose is to track
consumption of resources, the purpose of auditing is
to determine the nature of a user’s network activity.
Examples of auditing information include the identity of
the user, the nature of the services used, what hosts were
accessed when, what protocols were used, etc.”
For the rest of this paper, we use the definitions of Authen-
tication, Authorization, Accounting and Auditing described
above. The well known network architecture based on, e.g.,
WPA2/Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)-Transport
Layer Security (TLS) [6], [7] and a Remote Authentication
Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) [8] server (cf., Figure 3) sup-
ports Authentication, Authorization, Accounting and Auditing
(AAAA). We will briefly describe the network operation. In
the first step, a MS authenticates the RADIUS server by using
a digital certificate. This operation protects the MS against
communication with a malicious server. When the server is
trusted, a secured tunnel between the MS and the RADIUS
server is established. The tunnel is secured by means of strong
public/private key cryptography and allows the MS to send its
credentials in a secure manner. The RADIUS server issues a
Master Key (MK) when MS is successfully authenticated and
authorized. A copy of the key goes to the MS. The MS and
the RADIUS server derive a Primary Master Key (PMK) by
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Figure 3. WPA2/EAP-TLS with RADIUS
using the MK and a hashing function. The RADIUS server
sends the PMK to the AP. In this phase the AP and the MS
both have a copy of the PMK being a symmetric master key for
future secure communication. Once, a secure tunnel between
the AP and the MS is established, the MS can use the Internet
connection. The AP assumes that the data exchanged by the
MS-AP tunnel belongs to the legitimate MS (because only
the MS and the AP know the PMK). Consequently, the AP
can gather statistics on the MS-AP tunnel activity, e.g., sent
and received traffic, etc. and then issues accounting messages
to the RADIUS server [9]. Accounting information serves for
future auditing and billing.
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Figure 4. Captive Portal
The Captive Portal is another possible solution. We use
it, because it is simple and does not require any additional
protocols like EAP, etc. A MS does not need to provide any
sophisticated software to join the network. An architecture
of the Captive Portal is built upon the NAS AAA paradigm
(cf., Figure 4). At the beginning of operation a MS associates
with an AP. The MS gets the network address, but its traffic
is blocked at the AP by some sort of a firewall. Each
time the MS issues a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
request, it is redirected to an AAA server in order to establish
secure connection. Once a secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol
Secure (HTTPS) tunnel is established, the MS is requested
to authenticate itself by presenting credentials. If the AAA
server successfully authenticates and authorizes the MS to use
network resources, the server requests the AP to reconfigure
its firewall and allow MS’ traffic. The traffic is recognized
by the MS’ network and link layer addresses. Starting from
this point, the MS has full access to the Internet. The AP can
bookkeep traffic originated at or destined to the MS and issues
the accounting messages to the AAA server.
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Figure 5. Shibboleth architecture
Because each Captive Portal is a service with a web-based
interface, one can replace an AAA server with the SWITCHaai
architecture [10], [11] especially designed to protect web
services. The disadvantage of this solution is that, at the
moment, SWITCHaai does not natively support accounting 1.
The big advantage is that the architecture is simple and fits
well the Captive Portal paradigm.
We describe the architecture of SWITCHaai/Shibboleth
being one of the most prominent Authentication Authorization
Infrastructure (AAI) mechanisms for educational institutions.
The current Shibboleth AAI architecture consists of the fol-
lowing interconnected entities: “User”, “Service Provider” and
“Identity Provider”.
A user is a human being operating a computing device (e.g.,
a personal computer or a laptop) interconnected by a network
with other entities. A Service Provider manages protected
1The implementation of the accounting functions is under development and
expected to become operational soon.
resources (e.g., an online library secured against unauthorized
users) and decides whether a user is authorized to access
a resource or not. Decisions are based on assertions being
delivered by Identity Providers (IdPs). The role of an IdP is
to deliver a security context to the Service Provider (SP). The
security context depends on credentials presented by a user to
the IdP.
We illustrate the authentication and authorization process in
Figure 5. A user asks a SP for a particular resource. When the
SP does not have a valid security context, the user is redirected
to its home organization IdP to authenticate itself against an
IdP. The IdP creates a security context at the SP and redirects
the user once again to the SP. As the security context exists
at the SP, the SP may authorize a user to access the resource.
This method has many advantages, e.g., the user authenticates
itself against his own IdP, so the important data is not shared
with third parties. SPs only get the parameters needed for a
user authorization process and they do not see the sensitive
credentials.
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Figure 6. SWITCHaai protected Captive Portal
We now present the current architecture of the SWITCHaai
protected Captive Portal (cf., Figure 6). The difference be-
tween the SWITCHaai architecture and the NAS AAA ar-
chitecture is that the Shibboleth IdP server returns a security
context to the AP, being a service provider in this scenario.
Once, the AP possesses the information about authenticated
user, the AP asks the Authorization service for permission to
open the Internet connection for the MS. If the authorization
service positively replies, the AP reconfigures its firewall, and
thus the MS obtains full access to the Internet. As in the NAS
model, the MS has a network address from the beginning
and the credentials are sent over a secure channel, so the
architecture is eavesdropping protected. The MS only presents
credentials at home organization.
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Figure 7. SWITCHaai protected Captive Portal by using WMNs
Because the wired infrastructure is expensive and limits the
operational range, we propose to use WMNs as a complement
or extension to wired networks. In this situation, a node
delivering a signal to end users does not need to be directly
connected to the wired infrastructure. In order to protect the
wireless network, we design AAAA mechanisms compatible
with WMNs. We present a Captive Portal solution being
simple and compatible with the software installed on the
majority of client machines (cf., Figure 7).
II. WIRELESS MESH NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
For the proposed A4 Mesh architecture, we distinguish
different building elements: Authorization service, IdPs,
Gateways (GWs), Master server, MNs and MSs (cf., Fig-
ure 8). MNs and MSs only use wireless communication, but
GWs have both wired and wireless interfaces to provide the
Internet connection to all-wireless stations. GWs and MNs
form a wireless backhaul delivering a signal to MSs being
end users or clients of our network. Each MS has a single
owner, a human being running the device. The MS’ owner
is recognized by its digital identity. A MS is a client will-
ing to use network resources, having a compatible hardware
interface. MSs get connectivity to the Internet by associating
themselves with MNs running access point like services. If the
digital identity is recognized, it gives rights to use network
resources. By analogy to MSs, each MN and GW has its own
digital identity. MNs and GWs are responsible for building
the network infrastructure, providing resources and extending
network coverage. The architecture provides a single, easily
expandable WMN, in which GWs, MNs, and MSs belong
to one or many organizations (the Shibboleth federation). A
single Master server is responsible for granting access to the
network based on assertions from IdPs and the Authorization
service. Our network is built upon the Internet Protocol (IP).
At the beginning of operation, each node (GW, MN, MS)
obtains a network local unique IP address (i.e., within the
WMN) from the Master server. The WMN runs a routing
protocol like: AODV, OLSR, 802.11s, etc. so that every packet
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Figure 8. A4 Mesh Architecture
originated at the GW, MN or MS can reach the destination if
the path exists. Only GWs and MNs are responsible for packet
forwarding, MSs are end points of information flows.
A. Mesh Node to Mesh Node function
In the following, we describe an example of the operation
between two MNs being immediate neighbors (cf., Figure 9).
When two MNs sense each other, they can exchange messages
by using their wireless interfaces. Imagine that MN A sends
a data packet to MN B. At the beginning B only accepts
signaling, routing protocol packets, or requests originated at
or destined to the Master server or Shibboleth IdPs. Other
traffic is dropped by the firewall at MN B. Note that the
routing protocol is working in the network, because its traffic
is accepted and exchanged between communicating MNs.
We allow full communication between a pair of intermediate
neighbors only if a secure tunnel is established. To establish
a secure tunnel, one of the MNs (MN A) sends a “request for
tunnel” signaling packet to its neighbor and visits the Master
server (key server) to obtain a MK for communication between
MN A and MN B. The master server redirects request to the
IdP at which the MN authenticates itself sending credentials.
The second MN (MN B) obtains the request for tunnel. It
is obliged to ask the Master server for the PMK suitable for
MN A-MN B communication. Requesting at the Master server,
it is also redirected to the IdPs to authenticate itself. Once the
authentication process is finished, the Master server possesses
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Figure 9. MN to MN operation
a security context based on the authentication of MN A and
MN B. Based on the security context, the Master server asks
the Authorization service for permission to establish a secure
tunnel, between MN A and MN B. If the permission is granted,
the Master server issues the MK and derives the PMK. MN A
obtains the MK and MN B gets the PMK. MN A derives
the PMK, so starting from this moment MN A and MN B
both have the PMK being a symmetric key and they establish
a secure tunnel. In a normal network operation, each MN
establishes secure tunnels with every neighboring MN so that
every packet originated at a MN can reach its destination in the
WMN or Internet. Not authorized MNs cannot exchange traffic
with neighboring nodes and thus they cannot inject traffic into
the wireless backhaul.
In terms of a performance, we can distinguish several costs
of this configuration, i.e., packet forwarding, routing overhead
and key management. The cost of packet forwarding is high,
because each consecutive node along the way towards the des-
tination encrypts and decrypts the forwarded packet, however,
the usage of symmetric cryptography is not so computationally
exhausting. We do not introduce the routing overhead, because
MNs can communicate along the shortest or most efficient
paths. The key management is also at a reasonable level, be-
cause each node maintains O(d) different keys, where d is the
number of the node’s immediate neighbors. Our organization
of the wireless backhaul is obviously very flexible and we just
presented a single specification out of many other possibilities.
We can use different methods. One possible replacement is that
each MN gets the same key after successful authentication and
authorization. In this case the backhaul would be protected
by a single key and consecutive encryptions and decryptions
at each hop are not necessary. In a different example, each
node only maintains a secure tunnel with the Master server,
so it increases the forwarding efficiency, however, reduces
the routing performance, because the Master server has to
forward traffic between MNs exchanging data packets. In
another solution, we can exchange keys between any pair of
communicating MNs, however, this increases the cost of key
management, because each node maintains O(N) keys, where
N is the number of MNs in the network. We are going to
implement several methods to protect the wireless backhaul
against unlegitimate users and a more detailed performance
analysis will be available in the future work.
B. Mesh Node to Mobile Node function
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The Captive Portal functionality is illustrated in Figure 10.
When a MS associates with a MN its traffic is blocked by a
firewall running at the MN. In the initial phase, when the MS
is using a web browser, all HTTP requests are redirected to
the Master server to establish a HTTPS connection. Note that
firewalls at every consecutive MN accept traffic going to the
Master server and IdPs. The Master server redirects the request
to the IdP to perform the user authentication. The MN sends
credentials to the IdP so that the IdP creates a security context
at the Master server. The MN bordering with the MS keeps
track of the MS’ authentication messages, e.g., by computing
hashes of the IP packets and sending them to the Master
server. By comparing the received hashes with its own track,
the Master server exactly knows which of MNs provides a
signal to the successfully authenticated MS. The Master server
asks the Authorization service for permission to grant the MS
full access to the Internet. When the Authorization service
confirms that the MS can use the connection, the Master
server requests the MN to reconfigure the firewall to accept the
MS’ traffic and updates its internal relation between the MS’
IP address and the client identity running the MS (at every
moment, the Master server exactly knows who is occupying a
given IP address). To conclude, a firewall at the MN is a key
point for the overall network security. Once, a MN accepts
a packet coming from a MS and forwards it further over the
secure channel to the intermediate MNs, the forwarding nodes
do not make any other security checks related to the packet
origin.
III. ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
Accounting is a very important part of the A4 Mesh
architecture. From the general perspective its objective is to
bookkeep resources consumed by MSs. Notice, that a single
packet originated at a MS can be forwarded in a multi-hop
way consuming resources at several MNs. The task relies
now in tracking this consumption. In the current state, the
SWITCHaai/Shibboleth architecture does not natively support
accounting, however, in the future it will deliver a method of
transporting the accounting information between two commu-
nicating entities: the Master server and an accounting server in
the Internet performing the long term data storage. Each MN is
responsible for accounting at short term with a high granularity
and sending the accounting information to the Master server.
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Figure 11. Mesh Node accounting architecture
Based on [12], we define the MN accounting function
including metering, collecting and sending information to
the Master server (cf., Figure 11). A MN runs a meter, a
program that gathers and puts statistics to a local log-file.
A MN’s collector is a process taking the data from the
log-file and sending it to the Master server by using the
accounting protocol. When the Master server gets records
stored by MNs, they only contain the information on the
forwarded flows identified by the IP addresses within the
WMN. The Master server derives an identity responsible for
the particular consumption of the network resources by virtue
of the IP address-Identity relation. Starting from this moment,
the Master server is able to issue accounting messages to
the Accounting server containing resources consumed by a
particular user.
IV. WMN NETWORK MONITORING AND MANAGEMENT
Our AAAA capable WMN is built out of MNs extending an
Intranet (e.g., a University network) to distant areas in which
the access to the network is mandatory, but ordinary wired
networks are not available. Furthermore, it shall be possible
to include MN nodes placed in remote areas (e.g., in mountain
regions) where they are instrumental, e.g., for environmental
measurements 2. Because in such a case some of the MNs are
not easily accessible, the network should be reliable and have
a good network management and monitoring system. We now
give a brief technical description of our network.
A. Mobile Stations and Mesh Nodes
There are no special requirements for MSs. They only
require a standard Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 adapter to join the network. Some of
the MNs can be solar-powered, so energy efficient operation
is required. To guarantee a continuous operation, a solar
panel must be able to recharge a battery during its daily
operation to compensate the 24 h energy consumption. MNs
are usually built upon embedded hardware platforms. In our
scenario, we use ALIX boards from PCEngines. The boards
contain a single 500 MHz, i586 compatible CPU, 256 MB
RAM, two wireless IEEE 802.11n interfaces Wistron DNMA-
92, an Ethernet controller and a CompactFlash (CF) card.
The platform has several important advantages: it is small,
cheap, energy efficient, it does not contain moving mechanical
elements like coolers or disks affected by failures. It can
operate with a DC power source delivering 7V - 20V. To
prevent from CF card failures, we want to limit writing cycles
on the CF card as much as possible, as the heavy and long
term operation on the memory card may quickly destroy it.
In case of a failure, an on-board watchdog device can reboot
the system. We use a very lightweight, tailored version of the
Linux operating system. The ADAM Linux distribution [14]
contains only relevant programs and it can be easily extended
with a new software. Contrary to mesh nodes, gateways and
other parts of our system located in the Internet are built out
of high performance desktop systems. A gateway possesses
wired and wireless interfaces in order to connect the WMN to
the wired Internet.
2The installation of a WMN equipped with various sensors for capturing
hydrogeological data in a remote mountain region [13] serves as test environ-
ment for the A4 Mesh architecture.
B. Network Monitoring and Management
The monitoring operation enables detecting different rea-
sons of failures. Imagine a situation in which a solar panel
is broken and it does not charge a battery. To prevent from a
node failure, the monitoring system generates alarms to warn
a network administrator about a dangerous situation. Even if
the administrator does not have enough time to react and the
node dies as soon as its battery is empty, the administrator
has a good knowledge about broken components and is able
to quickly repair the system (fault management). From the
more general perspective, system oriented statistics allow us to
compute an average system accessibility and compare it with
parameters of wired network devices. Link oriented statistics
reflect the performance of the network.
In order to deal with all accounting objectives from Sec-
tion III, we use a system collecting and sending accounting
information to the Master server. We can reuse this system for
network monitoring purposes in which each MN is responsible
for gathering specific data classes:
• system oriented monitoring
• link level oriented monitoring
The first class contains system oriented parameters like
the remaining battery time, power consumption, solar panel
power, CPU and memory usage, number of processes, uptime,
watchdog resets etc.
The second class is link oriented. MNs communicate by
using the IEEE 802.11n cards. In order to measure the link
performance, we use different techniques (e.g., active, passive,
hybrid) [15]. We accumulate different statistics about the
wireless medium and use this information in the future to
optimize a routing decision, channel allocation or to alarm,
e.g., that a link is broken. Many studies on Wireless Mesh
Networks proved that it is difficult to operate a high per-
formance WMN using simple hop count or latency metrics
in the routing decisions [16]. The wireless medium is too
complex for that [17] (cf., Section I). We gather the following
information: a list of immediate neighbors, received signal
strength, different link quality metrics like: ETX–average num-
ber of packet retransmissions [18], ETT–average time spend on
packet transmission, i.e., a wireless medium active usage [19],
air-time metric [20], etc., β–metric–link burstiness [21]. These
metrics approximate the wireless link quality. We also try
to distinguish the reasons of packet losses among: collisions,
hidden nodes problems and noise errors [22].
In our scenario, we have the long range operating links,
however a long distance has a degrading influence on the link
performance, because the MAC medium sharing mechanism
does not satisfactorily work under this condition. IEEE 802.11
CSMA/CA introduces specific time scales like DIFS, SIFS,
Timeslots limiting the operational range to a few kilome-
ters [23].
V. RELATED WORK
Much work concerns AAAA related issues in WMNs.
Cheikhrouhou et al. [24] adapted IETF Protocol for carry-
ing Authentication for Network Access (PANA) designed to
transmit EAP messages over the IP for WMNs. When a
MS is authorized, it establishes an Internet Protocol Security
(IPSec) tunnel with an enforcement point to get access to the
Internet. Khan et al. [25] designed a MS-MN authentication
function based on PANA and EAP-TTLS. After successful
authorization a MS establishes a secure tunnel with a MN
based on symmetric-key cryptography. Martignon et al. [26]
proposed a two step associating function. In the first step a
MS/MN associates itself with a network by using a classical
IEEE 802.11i EAP-TLS mechanism. When a MN successfully
passes the first step, it can upgrade its role in the network by
accessing the key protected wireless backhaul. The MN needs
to authenticate itself against a Key Server. After successful
authentication, the MN gets the key and joins the backhaul.
From the other perspective, fair and distributed accounting
architectures like [27], [28] allow us to measure sent and
forwarded traffic per MN. However, the architectures are
distributed, the MNs cannot lie about their network activity
because of a sophisticated protocol interacting between MNs
and a trusted server.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have described a simple AAAA oriented
WMN architecture. The main contributions include an easily
expandable wireless mesh network running the Captive Portal,
which grants access to the Internet. We designed a protected
network of MNs forwarding user traffic in a secure manner. A
user authenticates itself against his home organization IdP, so
the credentials are not exposed to third parties. Once a user
is successfully authenticated, the bordering MN allows MS
traffic to enter the wireless backhaul. Finally, the accounting
system counts all resources consumed by the user network
activity enabling further auditing and billing. Our architecture
fits well IP based networks, because entire communication
uses HTTP protocol, unlike EAP-RADIUS, which requires
PANA to handle authentication messages.
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